Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogeneous. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are studied which di¤er for the considered sociopolitical structure: communal property in one case and private property in the other. We hereby show that in both games when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists a norm of investment and a norm of surplus division must coevolve. While the investment norm always supports the e¢ cient investment pro…le, the surplus division norm may di¤er among these games depending on the size of investment cost gap. Under private property only the egalitarian surplus division evolves. Under communal property instead two di¤erent surplus division norms may evolve: the egalitarian one and an inegalitarian norm. We show that no cap to payo¤s inequality emerges under private property while an inequality payo¤ cap endogenously evolves under communal property. The games have been proposed to explain the social norms used in modern hunter-gatherer societies.
Introduction
There is consensus among anthropologists that, despite some observed di¤er-ences, the strong central tendency across contemporary hunter-gatherer societies is to cooperate in the hunt and to share the game. A telling example can be found among the Ache of Paraguay which seem to have developed a rule of thumb for hunted resources of the kind "cooperate frequently and share fully" (Hill, 2002) . In some cases the egalitarian distribution of hunted resources is found even when di¤erences in ability are observed (Kaplan and Hill, 1985) meaning that the more skilled hunters are taxed to create a common pool of resources that feeds everyone about equally (Bohem, 2004) . The widespread observation of cooperation and sharing led some social scientists to suggest that they must be part of the ruling social norms that must have been evolving over time, probably as a way to regulate large-game hunting (Bohem, 2004) .
Although egalitarianism seem to characterize these small scale societies, Lee (1990) recommends not to take egalitarianism as synonymous of perfect equality: "(...) perfect equality doesn't exist anywhere. It is a fact of life that human beings di¤er in their abilities (...). What is signi…cant is that some societies take these di¤erences and minimize them, to the point of making them disappear, while other societies take the same basic material and magnify it" (Lee, 1990; 236) .
According to Lee (1990) the watershed line between egalitarian and not egalitarian societies seems to lay in the role of property: societies based on communal property are egalitarian since they have developed a leveling device; societies in which property is secured do not have such a device and therefore are not egalitarian.
The goal of this paper is twofold. On one hand we want to explore whether and under what conditions social norms supporting both an e¢ cient outcome and neat distributional rule can endogenously arise through an evolutionary process in societies characterized by skill heterogeneity. On the other hand we want to test whether these evolved social norms support the idea that inequality in societies based on common property is smaller than in societies in which property is secured.
In order to do this we study a two-stage game with two risk-neutral players (A and B). In stage one, the production stage, both players have to simultaneously decide whether to invest or not; in stage two, the bargaining stage, after observing the gross surplus produced, they have to decide how to divide it. We assume that the investment is costly and that the cost incurred by A is greater than the cost incurred by B: This di¤erence among costs can be seen as the result of skill heterogeneity with A being the less e¢ cient agent. The surplus depends on the investment pro…le; we further assume that when nobody invests no surplus is produced and both agents receive nothing. Thus, a bargaining stage only occurs when at least one agent has invested in the …rst stage.
Two di¤erent extensive games, corresponding to two di¤erent structures of political and social organization, are considered. In both extensive games we assume that when the two players have chosen to invest the bargaining stage follows the rule of the Nash Demand Game (NDG). When, on the other hand, an asymmetric investment pro…le is observed two simple alternatives are considered. Each of these speci…es how the unique investing agent can reap the rewards of her own action.
In the …rst alternative we assume that the sociopolitical organization promotes full right of possession. As a consequence all the bargaining power is assigned to the player who has decided to invest; by allowing her to behave as a dictator, the bargaining stage then collapses into a Dictator Game (DG). In this framework if a sharing occurs it only depends on the free will of the unique investing agent. The anthropological literature suggests that this game can be appropriate in a society in which production is a collective venture and property rights are secured, as it seems to happen among the Mbuti pygmies (Ichikawa, 1983) .
In the second alternative we assume that, since the sociopolitical organization promotes communal property, in order to gather the surplus, an agreement has to emerge. However, despite nobody can be excluded from receiving a fair share, this agreement has to emerge in a situation in which only the unique investing player has the right to make a proposal. This suggests that bargaining can take the form of an Ultimatum Game (UG) in which the player who has chosen to invest proposes a distribution which is only realized if the opponent accepts it otherwise the surplus is lost due to con ‡ict. The anthropological literature suggests that this game can be suitable for a society in which production is an individual activity but in which full right of possession is not supported, as it seems to be the case for the !Kung (Woodburn, 1982) .
By DG (resp. U G ), we denote the whole game in which an NDG occurs when a symmetric investment pro…le is observed, and a DG (resp. UG) occurs when an asymmetric investment pro…le is observed. Both games (i.e. U G and DG ) have a multiplicity of equilibria; nevertheless the equilibrium selection problem may be solved if adequate social norms are in place (Binmore, 1998 (Binmore, , 2007 Binmore and Shaked, 2010) . Since in our model agents strategically interact in each stage of the game, the social norm of interest is twofold: it is a norm of cooperation, which dictates how to play the production stage, and a norm of distribution, which dictates how to divide the surplus produced. In order to identify the evolved social norms we use the concept of stochastic stability and we apply the evolutionary framework for extensive games put forward by Noldeke and Samuelson (1993) . We claim that a social norm has evolved when the stochastically stable set only supports an homogeneous behavior for at least one population.
Our main result states that in both games when a social norm evolves then not only do we observe an homogeneous behavior along the whole path of play but the prescribed actions are uniform across populations. We can thus claim that in both games norms coevolve.
When a coevolution of norms is observed, the investment norm supports full cooperation in the production stage (meaning that both agents choose to invest), regardless of the sociopolitical organization considered. However the two games di¤er depending on both the condition needed for the two norms to evolve and the kind of evolved bargaining norm.
When property is secured (i.e DG ) we show that norms always coevolve and the bargaining norm supports an equal surplus division. In this case a higher cost gap raises payo¤s inequality and no endogenous inequality cap exists. When communal property is considered (i.e U G ) we show that norms coevolve only if is the total investment cost su¢ ciently limited; in this case the evolved bargaining norm depends on the parameters con…guration. In particular equal sharing continues to be the observed norm when it gives to both agents the incentive to invest. When instead equal sharing gives the incentive to invest to the most e¢ cient agent only we show that an unequal surplus division norm arises granting to the less e¢ cient agent a larger surplus share. As a consequence payo¤s inequality now turns out to be a decreasing function of the cost gap. Given that the size of the cost gap matters in determining which kind of bargaining norm evolves, we claim that an inequality cap now springs from evolution. In addition, for some parameters con…guration the unequal bargaining norm gives to each agent a share equals to her investment cost plus half of the remaining net surplus, as predicted by Equity Theory; when this occurs payo¤s equality is observed.
For whatever sociopolitical organization considered, the agent with smaller investment cost is the advantaged one. However we claim that the unequal surplus division norm emerging under communal property has a Rawlsian taste: by providing to the disadvantaged agent the largest share of the surplus, it ensures to the advantaged agent the cooperation of the disadvantaged one.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. The evolutionary dynamics are studied in Section 3 and the main results presented in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the discussion of our results together with the analysis of inequality. In the last Section we compare our results with those of the related existing literature.
The model
Two risk neutral players (A and B) are engaged in a two-stage game. In stage one both have to simultaneously decide whether to invest (action H) or not (action L); when a player chooses H she incurs in a cost. We denote by c A and c B the cost supported by agent A and B respectively. A surplus is produced and observed at the end of stage one; each player can then correctly estimate his opponent's investment. We denote the surplus arising when both choose H by V H ; the surplus accruing when only one chooses H by V M ; and lastly, when
In stage two, they bargain over the available surplus. The bargaining rule depends on the investment pro…le. If both have chosen H, they are engaged in a Nash Demand Game (NDG). If they have chosen di¤erent investments, two alternatives are conceivable: an Ultimatum Game (UG) and a Dictator Game (DG). We denote U G the whole extensive game in which a NDG occurs when both players have invested while a UG occurs when only one player has invested. Analogously we denote DG the whole extensive game in which a DG occurs when only one agent has invested. Let D (V j ) = f ; 2 ; :::; V j g ; j 2 fH; M g denotes the set of feasible claims.
Throughout the paper we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 (a) V H =2; c A and c B are all divisible by ; (b) c A c B > ; (c) the maximum payo¤ attainable by playing H when the opponent chooses L is not negative, i.e.
(d) the e¢ cient net surplus arises when both players choose H; i.e.
(e) the population is su¢ ciently large, i.e.
When is negligible, Points (b), (c) and (d) of Assumption 1 are satis…ed for c A c B ; c A V M and c A < V H V M : In turn, these conditions are satis…ed when: In NDG players A and B simultaneously make demands y and x; respectively. If these demands are compatible, each receives what she claimed; otherwise they receive nothing. The payo¤s are
In UG the player who has chosen H makes a proposal which the opponent can either accept or reject. Let's suppose HL is observed and A proposes the division (y; V M y). If B accepts, the payo¤s are y c A for A and V M y for B; otherwise A gets c A and B nothing. An analogous situation occurs when LH is observed and B proposes the division (V M x; x). If A accepts, the payo¤s are V M x for A and x c B for B; otherwise B gets c B and A nothing.
In DG the division continues to be advanced by the player who has chosen H; however her opponent now has no choice but to accept. Suppose HL is observed and A demands y: The payo¤s are y c A for A and V M y for B.
It is worth noticing that, under previous Assumption 1, both U G and DG admit a subgame perfect equilibrium which supports investment pro…le HH. Note, however, that the games admit a great number of subgame perfect equilibria, some of which are ine¢ cient.
Evolutionary dynamics
In this Section, we apply to our model the evolutionary dynamics put forward by Noldeke and Samuelson (1993) . To this end we postulate a …nite population of size N agents for each player, A and B. In each period, every possible match between agents occurs meaning that each agent belonging to population A interacts with each agent of population B, one at a time. An agent is described by a characteristic which consists of a detailed plan of action and a set of beliefs about the opponent's behavior.
In U G , the plan of actions for player A must specify: (i) the type of investment; (ii) the demand when both players choose H (the action at HH); (iii) the demand when A chooses H and B chooses L (the action at HL); (iv) whether to accept or reject any demands made by B, when in the …rst stage B chooses H and A chooses L. Analogously for player B.
In DG , the plan of actions for player A must specify: (i) the type of invest-ment; (ii) the demand when both players choose H (the action at HH); (iii) the division of the surplus when A chooses H and B chooses L (the action at HL). Analogously for player B.
A state, ; is a pro…le of characteristics of the overall population and z ( ) is the probability distribution over terminal nodes generated by . The set of possible states, ; is …nite.
At the end of every period each agent has a probability to observe the distribution of outcomes z( ) and may change her characteristics. In particular this stream of information allows agents to correctly update their beliefs on opponent's choices at the reached information sets. Given their new beliefs they also update their action pro…le by choosing a best reply 1 at each information set. With probability 1 the single agent does not observe z ( ) and her characteristics do not change. This learning mechanism engenders an (unperturbed) Markov process ( ; P ) where P is the transition matrix on .
By
we denote a generic limit set 2 of the unperturbed process; this is a minimal subset of states such that, when the process enters, it does not exit. By we denote the union of limit sets of the unperturbed process. Lastly by ( ) we denote the set of outcomes that can be observed.
Besides being updated, agents' beliefs and actions can also change by mutation. In every period each agent has a probability of mutating. When mutating, agents change their characteristics according to a probability distribution assigning positive probability on each possible characteristic. Mutations are independently distributed across agents. Assume that the process is in some limit set and that a single mutation occurs which alters the characteristics of a single agent (the mutant). If this mutation does not alter the action prescribed and/or the beliefs held by the mutant, then the mutation is called drift. Since the expected payo¤ of the others does not change, their characteristics do not change; we then move from one limit set to another limit set 0 by drift.
Mutations generate a new (perturbed) Markov process ( ; P ( )) ; which is ergodic. It is well known that, for any …xed > 0; the perturbed process has a unique invariant distribution . Let = lim !0 denote the limit distribution: A state is stochastically stable if ( ) > 0: We denote the set of stochastically stable states by S ; this is the set of states which has a positive probability in limit distribution. Noldeke and Samuelson (1993) proved that the stochastically stable set is contained in the union of the limit sets of the unperturbed process. Only when the set of stochastically stable states ( S ) contains equilibria supporting the same unique outcome can we speak of 1 However, if the learning agent has already played a best reply, her action does not change. Moreover when the best reply contains more than one action, then one of these can be chosen randomly, according to a distribution with full support. 2 A set is called a ! limit set of the process ( ; P ) if: (a) 8 2
a stochastically stable outcome rather than a stochastically stable set. In order to detect the stochastically stable set, we have …rst to characterize the limit sets of our model; this is the aim of the following two Propositions.
Proposition 2
In U G , all the limits sets have one of the following structures: (a) they contain one state only and this is a self-con…rming equilibrium of the game; (b) they contain more than one state and all investment pro…les are observed. Moreover, only one outcome is realized for each investment pro…le in which the claims exhaust the surplus.
Proof. See the Appendix 3 .
Proposition 3
In DG , all the limits sets contain one state only and this is a self-con…rming equilibrium. Moreover, at least one agent chooses to invest in every equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
From now on when we speak of equilibrium we refer to self-con…rming equilibrium. 4 Propositions 2 and 3 state that the considered evolutionary dynamic gives rise to a large multiplicity of limit sets. However, this dynamic admits limit sets in which both investment and bargaining behavior is uniform in each population. It is thus likely that homogeneous behavior in one or both populations could be molded by evolution. When this happens we say that a norm has evolved. Accordingly, an investment norm has evolved if all agents belonging to the same population make the same investment and the investment behavior is anticipated correctly. Analogously, a bargaining norm has evolved if a pair of demands (y; x) exists at some reached information set which exhausts the gross surplus and the bargaining behavior is anticipated correctly.
Despite the fact that Propositions 2 and 3 do not help to pin down which behavior is more likely to become the conventional one, in the next Section we shall show that a unique stochastically stable outcome can exist in both games.
Main results
In this Section we show that when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists it always supports the e¢ cient investment pro…le and a well-de…ned distribution rule which is not always the egalitarian one. First and foremost, we provide a characterization of the stochastically stable set for U G . We then brie ‡y consider DG .
Communal property
we denote the share going to player B (resp. A), such that she receives an equilibrium payo¤ equal to (V M ) when both agents have invested:
Since c A and c B are divisible by and c B > ; then x
In other terms b x U A is the largest demand agent B can make at HH such that A does not have any incentive to change action by playing L when she knows that: 
When this condition holds, then we can de…ne the following set
where H is the set of equilibria in which both agents choose to invest and the surplus division rule assigns a share V H x to player A and x to player B: By de…nition when 2 U IH each agent receives an equilibrium payo¤ not smaller than the maximum payo¤ attainable when she deviates by playing L. Then any equilibrium in U IH dominates all the equilibria supporting other investment pro…les. Hence even if at an equilibrium 2 U IH the beliefs on the outcome in high-low matches drift, allowing some agents to expect to get almost the whole surplus if they do not invest, this drift does not push the process away from the basin of attraction of :
We can always partition the set H into 
It is easy to see that condition (7) is never satis…ed when c B V H 4 ; in this case the set U IH is empty. Condition (7) can be rewritten as:
c i denotes the payo¤ i gets under equal sharing and full cooperation in the production stage; V M denotes instead the maximum (when is negligible) payo¤ i could hope to get should she play L and all opponents continue to play H: Broadly speaking i denotes the minimum payo¤ gain that has to be granted to agent i to provide her the incentive to stick to the rule "cooperate in the production and equally share the surplus", on condition that all opponents population adheres too. Indeed if i < 0 agent i has the incentive to deviate from the rule by choosing L: Since B A ; condition (7) always requires B > 0; by contrast, under condition (7) ; A can take both positive and negative values.
The fact that, under condition (7)
Therefore, under condition (7) ; the set U IH is compatible with two di¤erent setting:
The …rst case occurs when, in addition to (7) ; we have A 0 i.e.
the second one occurs when, in addition to (7) ; we have A < 0 i.e.
Therefore two are the possible bargaining norms we can expect to arise from the considered evolutionary dynamic: the egalitarian surplus division norm in case (a) and an unequal surplus division norm in case (b). The next Proposition states our main result for U G . In order to derive this Proposition, we make use of both the su¢ cient condition developed by Ellison (2000) and some of the results for the NDG proved by Young (1993 
(b) if condition (7) does not hold then no norm evolves for whatever values of c A and c B .
Proof. See the Appendix Proposition 4 says that social norms supporting full cooperation at the production stage (i.e. the e¢ cient investment pro…le) and a neat division rule at the bargaining stage coevolve provided that the total investment cost is limited and investment are complementary. Investments are complementary if the marginal e¤ect of action H when the opponent plays H is greater than the marginal e¤ect of action H when the opponent plays L; condition satis…ed when V M < V H =2. When the investments are not complementary our result states that no norm evolves; analogously no norms evolve when investment are complementary but total investment cost is too high.
When total investment cost is limited and investments are complementary, Proposition 4 says that the speci…c division rule observed depends on the investment cost incurred by the less e¢ cient agent. When condition (9) holds, this cost is su¢ ciently limited and agents A do not have any incentive to deviate from the rule "cooperate in the production and equally share the surplus"; in this case the egalitarian surplus division rule evolves. When instead the investment cost incurred by the less e¢ cient agent is high enough, this agent may be induced to break the above rule. However when rooms of manoeuvre to a di¤erent bargaining norm still exist (i.e. when condition (10) holds in lieu of condition (9)) a not egalitarian surplus division rule evolves which still supports full cooperation in the production stage. Lastly when the total cost is such that no e¢ cient bargaining norm can emerge (i.e. when condition 7 does not hold) no norm arises.
It is straightforward to see that all the results stemming from Proposition 4 can be rewritten in terms of cost gap. Indeed, conditions (9) can be translated into c A c B B and condition (10) can be translated into B < c A c B 2 B : Hence what really matters in triggering a coevolution of norms and in specifying the division rule is the cost gap size. In particular norms evolve only when the cost gap is not higher than the two-fold minimum payo¤ gain of the most e¢ cient agent. When this condition is satis…ed, we can observe two di¤erent bargaining norms: (i) the egalitarian surplus division when the cost gap is not higher than B ; (ii) an unequal division when B is smaller than the cost gap. Figure 2 . In this Figure the parameters space compatible with Assumption 1 is divided into three regions. In region HH e the unique stochastically stable state supports full cooperation in the production stage and the egalitarian division of the surplus; in region HH ne the unique stochastically stable state still supports full cooperation in the production stage but a not egalitarian surplus division; lastly region N N corresponds to the parameter con…gurations in which no norm evolves since several outcomes are stochastically stable and no uniform behavior emerges. Figure 2 has been drawn for a given c B : Figure 3 shows that when c B increases both regions HH e and HH ne shrinks. When c B = 0; region HH ne is the largest possible and it coincides with the triangle P SS 0 . When c B = V H =12 (resp. V H =6); region HH ne shrinks to the triangle P RR 0 (resp. P QQ 0 ) since , it is easy to check that region HH ne disappears and its place is taken over by region N N .
Proposition 4 is illustrated in
6 -V M c A V H 4 c B V H 2 V H 4 V H 2 N N @ @ @ R HH ne
Private property
We now turn to the case in which a Dictator Game (instead of an Ultimatum Game) is played when an asymmetric investment pro…le is reached. In this case we denote by x D B (resp. V H x D A ) the share going to player B (resp. player A) such that she receives an equilibrium payo¤ equal to when both agents have invested:
Since c A , c B and 
When this condition holds, we can de…ne the following set
Also for DG we can always partition the set H into 
Proof. See the Appendix
Proposition 5 is illustrated in Figure 4 . By comparing Figure 4 with Figure  2 we see that when the rules of the game give all the bargaining power to the unique investing agent, under Assumption 1 norms of cooperation and norms of division always coevolve without any further conditions: Moreover, since norms are now insensitive to the degree of heterogeneity among agents (i.e. cost gap), these norms do not change when the investment costs are identical; the only consequence of cost heterogeneity is that region HH e shrinks as c B increases. Lastly, while an unique stochastically outcome can arise in U G only if investments are complementary, this is not required in DG : norms coevolve even when investments are not complementary, i.e. when V M V H 2 :
Discussion
In order to o¤er an interpretation of the results so far derived, let us consider again Proposition 4. This suggests that under communal property social norms supporting cooperation in the production stage are compatible with two di¤erent distributional rules.
The …rst is observed in region HH e and it supports the egalitarian division of the surplus or, in other terms, equality of resources. Equality of resources implies equality of welfare only when c A = c B . When instead c A > c B ; equality of resources generates inequality of welfare: in this case agent A (the less e¢ cient one) is disadvantaged. All this holds true also for DG :
The second distributional rule is observed in region HH ne and, since it is no longer the egalitarian division, it allows for inequality of resources. In particular, given that in this region c A > V H 2 V M , the share of the surplus going to agent A (i.e. the agent with higher investment cost) is greater than the share going to agent B (i.e. the agent with smaller investment cost), i.e.
Nevertheless in this region the payo¤ granted to A continues to be not greater than that granted to B meaning that agent A is still the disadvantaged one. Indeed, A's payo¤ is
Therefore this distributional norm ensures to player A a payo¤ which is slightly greater than the maximum payo¤ this agent can hope to get should she decide not to cooperate in the production stage (i.e. V M ). In this sense we can say that in HH ne the observed norm has a Rawlsian taste: by providing to the less e¢ cient agent the incentive to invest, it ensures to the advantaged agent B the cooperation of the less e¢ cient and disadvantaged A: This inegalitarian surplus division thus represents the maximal inequality compatible with the cooperation in the production stage 7 .
Lastly, it is worth noticing that, though this division rule is not egalitarian, it supports equality of payo¤s if c A = V H 2V M c B . In this particular case the evolved division norm is compatible with a rule suggested by the so-called Equity Theory 8 in which each player gets her investment cost plus an equal share of the remaining surplus 9 :
Few computations shows that
and
However when c A < V H 2V M c B agent A (resp. B) gets a share smaller (resp. larger) than the share predicted by Equity Theory.
Inequality
What we have just said has obvious consequences for the inequality observed in the two games. Figure 5 shows payo¤ as function of c A :
7 A somehow smilar result has been derived by Barling and von Siemens (2010) in the framework of incentivating contracts. They show that equal sharing is the optimal solution to incentive problems in partnership provided partners are inequity averse. This because equal sharing maximizes the incentives of the partner who has the weakest incentive to exert e¤ort. In our case equal sharing provides an adequate incentive to invest to the less e¢ cient agent in region HHe but not in region HHne.
8 Homas (1961) . 9 This rule is known in bargaining literature as "split the di¤erence". Consider U G …rst. We are in region HH e for c A V H 2 V M and in region HH ne for
In the …rst region payo¤ inequality increases with c A and it reaches its maximum level when c A = Figure 2 ; in Figure 5 the maximal payo¤ inequality corresponds to segment BC); in the second region payo¤ inequality decreases with c A and, as shown in Figure 5 , the less e¢ cient agent A receives a constant payo¤ V M (i.e. the line CD of Figure 5 ). We get payo¤ equality when c A = V H 2V M c B (i.e. at point D of Figure 5 and along the line CR of Figure 2) .
Consider now DG : In this case, since only region HH e exists, payo¤ inequality increases with c A : The maximum observable inequality is found when
Two are the conclusions drawing from the above analysis. First the two games admit a parameters con…guration giving rise to the same inequality; this occurs for the parameters con…guration for which region HH e of U G exists. Second the parameter con…guration giving rise to region HH ne has the main e¤ect to set a cap to the observable inequality in U G . Since no inequality cap endogenously arises in DG we may conclude that our analysis supports Lee's conjecture (Lee, 1990) , namely that only societies based on communal property are egalitarian since only these have developed a leveling device. In terms of our model the leveling device is represented by region HH ne ; however our analysis suggests that this leveling device only matters when the investment cost of the less e¢ cient agent is high enough.
Why an upper limit to inequality evolve in U G but no in DG ? We believe this is due to the fact that the considered sociopolitical organizations, giving rise to two di¤erent games, accord to the less e¢ cient agent A di¤erent incentives to cooperate. Consider U G : In region HH e we observe V M < 1 2 V H c A : When is negligible the left hand side denotes the maximum payo¤ A can hope to get, should she decide not to cooperate (i.e. in node LH); the right hand side denotes instead the payo¤ she gets under full cooperation given the evolved distributional rule. The inequality means that in region HH e agent A has always the incentive to cooperate in the production stage so that no further incentive is needed. In region HH ne we observe instead V M > 1 2 V H c A so that, under the egalitarian distribution of the surplus, A is better o¤ by not cooperating (in terms of Figure 5 the payo¤ accruing to A under the egalitarian surplus division is found along the line CG): Since all agents B might deem that A will only accept a distribution granting her almost the whole pie at LH pro…le, then B must grant to A a larger share of the surplus (i.e. V M + c A ) in order to induce this agent to cooperate. This, in turn, implies that A's payo¤ is equal to V M ; the larger share granted to A reduces payo¤ inequality as well. 10 One may wonder why in DG we do not observe an upper limit to inequality. When V M < 1 2 V H c A ; the same argument used above holds: agent A is better o¤ by cooperating in the production stage so that no further incentive is needed. When instead V M > 1 2 V H c A agent A should be incentivated to invest; however this is no longer e¤ective in DG . The reason is that when a node LH is reached (and this occurs when A does not invest), the investing agent B is now a dictator. Therefore even if A can hope to get V M > 1 2 V H c A ; this belief soon turns out to be a mistake since the dictator B shall only be willing to o¤er . By realizing that, A is better o¤ by cooperating in the production stage being
This, in turns, poses no limit to payo¤ inequality as c A increases:
The main di¤erence between game U G and game DG is that only the former has a collective action problem at its core. Indeed, by postulating an Ultimatum Game at nodes HL and LH; we have implicitly assumed that nobody can be easily excluded from consuming the produced good even when someone has not cooperated in the production stage. When one agent makes some bread and the cost of refusing a slice to another is too high to be worth paying, then the bread is not a perfectly private good (Hawkes, 1993) . In contrast, by postulating a Dictator Game at nodes LH and HL we have swept aside this collective action problem since the social structure now guarantees full protection to the unique investing agent. Our results suggest that a Rawlsian region evolves under two conditions: (a) the social structure must not o¤er full cover to the unique investing agent and (b) the investment cost supported by the less e¢ cient agent must be large enough but not too high, i.e. B < c A c B 2 B . When one of these two conditions does not hold, our result suggest that either an egalitarian surplus division evolves or no norms evolve.
Further discussion
Evolutionary dynamics in models with advance production and successive bargaining have been studied by Troger (2002) , Ellingsen and Robles (2002) as well as MacLeod (2001, 2008) . Broadly speaking this literature has shown that evolution (i.e. stochastic stability) may or may not support an e¢ cient investment pro…le depending on whether only one (Troger, 2002; Ellingsen and Robles, 2002) or both parties MacLeod, 2001, 2008 ) make a relation-speci…c investment in the project, respectively 11 . Despite the di¤erences, all these studies share the same homogeneity assumption since the investment costs are assumed to be the same for all investing agents.
The consequences of investment cost heterogeneity is investigated by Andreozzi (2010, 2011). He retains the same basic structure as in Troger (2002) and Ellingsen and Robles (2002) so that, in each period, the size of the pie is determined by the investment decisions of one agent only (A). However, depending on the investment cost, the population of investing agents can be split into two sub-populations: the more e¢ cient agents A L (i.e those with a low investment cost, c L ) and the less e¢ cient agents A H (i.e. those with a high investment, c H ). In any case, all the investing agents get the same share of the resulting surplus. This has an important consequence. In fact, when the evolved bargaining norm gives to the less e¢ cient investing agents A H the incentive to invest, a fortiori it gives the incentive to invest also to the more e¢ cient agent A L ; when this occurs the resulting equilibrium is e¢ cient. When instead the evolved bargaining norm grants the incentive to invest to the more e¢ cient agents only, then the less e¢ cient ones do not invest and the resulting equilibrium is ine¢ cient. 12 1 1 This literature is concerned with (one-sided or two-sided) relation-speci…c investment; by contrast our main interest is to study a generic setting in which people are not dependent on speci…c other people for access to basic requirements and in which individuals are not bound to …xed assets or …xed resources. This makes our model more apt for describing simple societies as modern hunter-gatherers (Woodburn, 1982) , for instance. 1 2 By contrast in our case all the stochastically stable outcomes are supported by e¢ cient equilibria of the considered games.
By comparing payo¤s inequality at the e¢ cient equilibrium with payo¤ inequality at the ine¢ cient equilibrium, Andreozzi (2011) concludes that e¢ ciency calls for greater inequality. This has an obvious explanation: a convention is e¢ cient only if it gives the incentive to invest to the least e¢ cient agent; since all the investing agents receive the same share of the surplus, the more e¢ -cient agents get an higher payo¤ because they bear a smaller investment cost. However, as Andreozzi (2011) correctly suggests, this does not necessarily lend support to the conclusion that, in economies with production, social justice has to be less egalitarian.
Our results support this view. In fact, also in our case at the stochastically stable equilibrium the more e¢ cient agent is granted a larger payo¤. In DG the resulting inequality follows from the same mechanism described by Andreozzi (2011), namely the fact that all investing agents receive the same share of the surplus; given the sociopolitical organization considered, this equal share gives to the less e¢ cient agent adequate incentives to invest. In U G the mechanism responsible for the resulting inequality is more subtle. In region HH e it still follows the same mechanism since the investment cost of the less e¢ cient agent is limited, i.e.c A 1 2 V H V M ; and both investing agents receives the same surplus share. However the mechanism which is responsible for the observed inequality is di¤erent in region HH ne since the investment cost of the less e¢ cient agent is su¢ ciently large, i.e.
In this case, in fact, in order to provide to the less e¢ cient agent the incentive to invest, the evolved bargaining norm grants to these agents a share of the surplus which is larger than the share going to the more e¢ cient ones (still preserving for the latter the incentive to invest). As a consequence, although the more e¢ cient agents are still the advantaged ones, the evolved bargaining norm has now the e¤ect of reducing payo¤s inequality. For some parameters con…guration we have also identi…ed a region in which not only does e¢ cient investment occurs but even payo¤ equality arises.
The role of fairness in bargaining games with advance production has also received some attention by experimental economics. However, only few of them are concerned with the case in which social output is determined by the investment decisions of all the subjects involved; here we brie ‡y discuss Gantner et al. These papers are both concerned with a two-stage game involving two agents. In the …rst stage agents simultaneously have to choose their investment level; investment is costly and an investment q i imposes a cost of q i . Social output is a weighted sum of the individual investment levels where each weight re ‡ects the marginal productivity of the investment chosen by the speci…c agent; investments are thus perfect substitute. In the second stage, after social output is observed, agents must divide it.
In Gantner et al. (2001) two di¤erent games are proposed to study this division; in the …rst agents play an Ultimatum Game where the proposer is randomly selected (after choosing the bargaining vectors); in the second agents play a Nash Demand Game. In Cappelen et al. (2007) instead the distribution stage is modeled as a Dictator Game; speci…cally, given informations about both the marginal productivity of opponent's investment and her investment level, each agent decides how to distribute the social output as if it were a dictator; in this case each subject's total earnings is the …nal outcome plus the amount of the initial endowment not invested.
The purpose of these papers is to test the concepts of fairness which are supported by the experimental evidence. 13 Both Gantner et al. (2001) and Cappelen et al. (2007) show that subjects choose the e¢ cient production in most cases and that, although several concepts of fairness are observed, the best predictor for the bargaining phase is equal shares.
14 Although there are several important di¤erences between our own models and these aforementioned papers 15 , we believe our results do not overtly contrast with the quoted experimental evidence. A point of agreement lies in the importance of equal sharing. In addition this experimental evidence gives some weight to the idea of accountability, i.e. on the notion that a fair distribution of joint output demands that this be allocated in proportion with individual contribution. Accountability also receives some weight in our model, albeit in a loose form. This occurs in region HH ne of U G where in order to give to the less e¢ cient agent the incentive to invest, he must be granted a larger share of the surplus. If investment cost is measured by e¤ort, the condition c A > c B ; coupled with the fact that (in our case) marginal productivity of investment are identical for the two agents, means that in order to provide the same ad- Moreover, in our case the marginal productivities of investment are the same across agents and heterogeneity is entirely due to di¤erent investment costs; in the quoted papers instead heterogeneity is due to marginal productivities of the investment and investment costs are the same only if agents choose the same investment levels. We also suggest that the bargaining protocol should be sensitive to the observed investment pro…le; this, coupled with the consideration of two di¤erent structures of socio-political organizations, lead us to propose two di¤erent games. ditional output agent A has to provide more e¤ort than agent B: This more e¤ort is rewarded by a larger share. One may interpret this reward as stemming from responsibility considerations; however, since responsibility does not enter explicitly into our model, we prefer to explain the larger share received by the less e¢ cient agent in Rawlsian terms, i.e. as representing the condition needed to ensure to the more e¢ cient and advantaged B the cooperation of the less e¢ cient and disadvantaged A: Nevertheless this interpretation leads exactly to a form of accountability, as expressed by Equity Theory (Gantner et al., 2001 ), for the speci…c parameters con…guration giving rise to the distribution speci…ed by (13) ; i.e. along the line CR of Figure 1 : However our results suggest that this concept of fairness can only evolve under quite strict conditions.
Appendix
First of all we introduce some notations. We denote by bse the least integer number greater than s when s is not an integer and (s + 1) is otherwise. Consider a state and suppose that all agents observe z ( ). Consider U G ; for an agent i 2 A; action L is not preferred to action H if
for an agent i 2 B action L is not preferred to action H if
Here we denote by p A ( ) (resp. p B ( )) the frequency of agent A (resp. B) who played H in , and by e y i HH ( ) (resp. e x i HH ( )) the expected payo¤s of agent i 2 A (resp. i 2 B) at the information set HH, given z ( ). Similar conditions hold for DG . The following result will be used afterwards.
Lemma 6 Let x HH;1 < x HH;2 < ::: < x HH;k be the demands made by B at HH for some state . Then the set of best behavioral demands following HH for agents A is a subset of fV H x HH;l g k l=1 .
Proof. See Lemma A.1 in Ellingsen and Robles (2002)).
Lemma 7 Consider U G and let be a limit set of ( ; P ) : If (HL; y HL ; x HL ) 2 ( ) [resp. (LH; y LH ; x LH ) 2 ( )] then:
(ii) (HL; y HL ; x HL ) [resp. (LH; y LH ; x LH )] is the only outcome which supports investment pro…le HL [resp. LH] in ( ) :
Proof. We only consider pro…le HL; the same holds true for LH. Point (i). Let be a state such that: (a) 2 ; (b) (HL; y HL ; x HL ) belongs to the support of z ( ) and x HL 6 = V M y HL . Let us suppose that only B agents update their characteristics: they will all accept y HL . For whatever belief on opponents'behavior, this action is always a best reply. It is then impossible to return to the original state . This contradicts the assumption that 2 .
Point (ii). First we show that cannot include a state in which multiple demands are made at HL. Subsequently, we show that cannot include two di¤erent states supporting di¤erent outcomes following HL.
Let be a state such that: (a) 2 and (b) multiple demands are made by agents A at HL. We already know from point (i) that at agents B accept all the demands made by their opponents. Suppose only agents A revise their characteristics; then any agent A will make the maximum demand observed at HL. Hence, it is impossible to return to the original state . This contradicts the assumption that 2 . Now let and 0 be two states such that: (a) both states belong to and (b) HL is observed. A single demand is made by A but y HL 0 > y HL ( ). Since it is impossible to return to then assumption 2 is contradicted. Lemma 8 Let be a limit set of ( ; P ) : If f(HH; y; x) ; (HH; y 0 ; x 0 )g 2 ( ) and either x 6 = x 0 or y 6 = y; then is a singleton and a self-con…rming equilibrium:
Proof. Consider a set and let 2 be a state in which at least two demands have been observed in one population (i.e. B). Suppose that at least one of these demands (x ) is not a best reply to z ( ). Suppose also that, after observing z ( ) ; all agents who demanded x revise; as a consequence x disappears. A new state 2 is then reached in which pro…le HH is still observed. Suppose now that all A update; then, by Lemma 6, nobody will make demand fV H x g. These two demands have thus disappeared and it is impossible to return to the original state . This contradicts the assumption that 2 . Therefore, if multiple demands are made, each must be a best reply to z ( ) :
Now consider an agent belonging to population A who has played H in and suppose this agent has the incentive to change her investment should she know z ( ). When this agent updates, the distribution of the demands made by population A in subgame HH di¤ers from the original. This implies that at least one demand made by some opponents (i.e. B) is no longer a best reply when B updates. By applying the argument made in the above paragraph, we conclude that at least one pair of demands has disappeared and cannot reappear. This contradicts the assumption that 2 .
By Lemma 7, since the set ( ) can include at most one outcome following the pro…le HL or LH, then state must be a self-con…rming equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that
is not a singleton. We know from Lemmas 7 and 8 that, if a bargaining subgame is reached, only one of its terminal nodes is observed.
First we show that ( ) must contain one outcome for every bargaining subgame. Of course ( ) must di¤er from f(HH; y HH ; V H y HH ) ; (LL; 0; 0)g : Suppose ( ) includes the following outcomes: (a) (HH; y HH ; x HH ) with y HH + x HH = V H ; (b) (HL; y HL ; x HL ) with y HL + x HL = V M : In a state in which both outcomes are observed must exist and it cannot be an equilibrium. We show that, from ; it is possible to reach either the basin of attraction of one equilibrium or a state in which all bargaining nodes are observed. Suppose some agents B update; if x HH c B > x HL they will choose H so that, at the new state 0 , the frequency of this action in population B will increase: Suppose now that at least one agent A has beliefs e y i LH leading her not to prefer H to L when all agents B play H; then, starting from ; it is possible to reach a state in which all investment pro…les are realized. To see this suppose y HH e y Otherwise, by letting all agents B to update, from it is likely to reach the basin of attraction of one equilibrium of the game supporting the outcome (HH; y HH ; x HH ). If x HH c B x HL the same conclusion obtains by a similar argument. It is simple to see that the same conclusion holds when ( ) includes any two di¤erent outcomes. Therefore if is not a singleton, all the bargaining nodes are visited meaning that ( ) includes four outcomes, each of which is a subgame equilibrium.
We now have to show that the payo¤s must satisfy a well-de…ned set of constraints. Notice that a state 2 in which all the investment pro…les are observed must exist. Moreover when we allow all agents to update, all agents A will choose H if
and all agents B will choose H if
We can rewrite these conditions as
First of all notice that all A i and B i can not be null since this would imply that is an equilibrium and a singleton. Furthermore, when -for some population -both expressions are either not negative or not positive, and at least one is not null, then the process can reach a new state which is a selfcon…rming equilibrium.
Consider the case in which both expressions are null for population A only. When B 1 is strictly positive and B 2 is strictly negative all Bs prefer H if p A ( ) > p A where:
Otherwise when B 1 is strictly negative and B 2 is strictly positive all Bs prefer H if p A ( ) < p A : In both cases, when all B agents update they will choose H. Hence a state which is an equilibrium of the game can be reached.
When both expressions B 1 and B 2 are null, we get a similar conclusion where the threshold value of p B ( ) is:
We are left with the case in which the product of the corresponding two expressions is strictly negative for each population. However, when A 1 and B 1 have the same sign, a similar argument allows us to reach the same conclusion. Indeed, suppose that both A 1 and B 1 are strictly positive. This implies that all Bs prefer H if p A ( ) > p A and all As prefer H if p B ( ) > p B . Hence, for whatever values of p A ( ) and p B ( ) ; starting from the process can reach an equilibrium when one population revises at a time. The remaining possible case occurs when B 1 B 2 < 0 and A 1 A 2 < 0 but A 1 B 1 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. It follows by applying the same arguments used in the proof of Proposition 2 above and taking into account that y HL = x LH = V M holds at any limit set. In this case the conditions B 1 B 2 < 0, A 1 A 2 < 0 and A 1 B 1 < 0 can not be simultaneously met because both A 2 and B 2 are strictly positive. Consequently all limit sets are singleton. In addition an equilibrium of the game can only support outcome (LL; 0; 0) if it also supports at least one outcome following each investment pro…le.
Several intermediate results are needed before turning to the proof of Propositions 4 and 5. From now on by slightly abusing notation, by (HH; y HH ; x HH ) we denote a terminal node in which both agents have chosen H, agent A makes a demand y HH and agent B makes a demand x HH . This applies for the other terminal nodes, too.
De…nition 9 Consider a union of limit sets X. This set is mutation connected if for all pairs , 0 2 X exists a sequence of limit sets ( 1 = ; 2 ; :::; n = 0 ) such that (a) for any k 2 f1; :::; n 1g ; k 2 X and (b) every transition from k to k+1 needs no more than one mutation.
Consider a limit set which does not support all information sets and suppose a single mutation occurs. If this mutation is a drift then the process reaches a new limit set 0 which di¤ers from only for some beliefs and/or actions at some unreached information sets. Let ( ) be the set of equilibria which only di¤er from for some beliefs (and/or actions) held in some unreached information set. Sure enough the set ( ) is mutation connected. When is singleton, namely = f g, we use ( ) instead of ( ) :
The next Lemma states our …rst preliminary result which holds true for both extensive games considered.
Lemma 10 Consider a limit set such that ( ) is not a singleton. An equilibrium supporting one outcome only can be reached from by a sequence of single-mutation transitions.
Proof. We give the detailed proof for U G ; we then suggest how to adapt it to DG : When multiple demands are observed at HH, we denote by fx HH;l ( )g I) Consider an equilibrium in which only the investment pro…le HH is observed and multiple demands are made. Let a single agent B switch from x HH;k ( ) to x HH;1 ( ). When agents A update they will make a demand y HH;k ( ) = V H x HH;1 ( ). Hence, we reach a new equilibrium 0 in which only HH is observed and only the two demands (V H x HH;1 ( ) ; x HH;1 ( )) occur.
II) Suppose now that two investment pro…les are observed at the equilibrium . We give the proof only when both HH and HL are observed. The other remaining cases are similar.
II.1) Consider the case in which multiple demands are made following HH.
Since is an equilibrium, the following conditions must always be met:
Consider an equilibrium 1 2 ( ). When y HH;1 c A > ; by a sequence of single mutations the population can get from to 1 2 ( ) where y HH;1 e y i LH ( 1 ) c A > 0 for all As. At 1 let a single agent A mutate from y HH;k ( 1 ) to y HH;1 ( 1 ) and let all agents B revise; as a consequence they will all choose H and ask V H y HH;1 . Therefore, the process reaches a new equilibrium 0 where 0 = fHH; y HH;1 ( ) ; V H y HH;1 ( )g. When instead y HH;1 c A , the inequality y HL c A 0 must hold for all A: Suppose a single A mutates from y HH;k ( 1 ) to y where y > y HH;k ( 1 ) and let all agents B update: as a consequence they will all choose L. Therefore, the process reaches a new equilibrium 0 where 0 = fHL; y HL ; V M y HL g. . When all agents B update, they will choose H being x HL = : Hence, the process reaches an equilibrium 0 where 0 = fHH; y HH;1 ; V H y H;1 g.
III)
Suppose now that all investment pro…les are observed at . Since is an equilibrium, the following conditions must be satis…ed:
where y HH;1 = V H x HH;k , y HL = V M x HL and y LH = V M x LH . We may rewrite these conditions as
We argue that when the second expression (A . When all agents A revise, they will play H and will make a demand y HL = V M . Let all agents B update. Since each agent B knows that x HL = and that all A have played H; then her best reply depends on the sign of (x HH;1 c). However, it is simple to see that whatever the value of x HH;1 c is, the process can reach a new equilibrium in which a smaller number of investment pro…les is realized. If, at this new equilibrium, two investment pro…les are realized, then the process can reach an equilibrium which supports a single outcome by a further sequence of single transitions (see point II.2 above).
When both A 0 2 and B 0 2 are positive, a single mutation occurring in population A is enough to move the process from to a new equilibrium 0 where 0 = fLH; y LH ; V M y LH g : The mutation needed depends on how many demands are observed at HH. In particular:
(i) when multiple demands are made at HH; one mutation from y HH;k ( ) to y HH;1 is enough;
(ii) when only one demand is made at HH; one mutation from H to L is enough:
IV) The remaining case occurs when is not a singleton. Under Point (c) of Assumption 1; at least one of the following two subgames (LH; V M ) and (HL; V M ) is never reached. The same argument used above implies that the population can get from to 0 through a sequence of single-mutations.
Let us consider now game DG . The above-mentioned arguments continue to work with minor modi…cations. In particular notice that, since y HL = x LH = V M ; then: (a) in case II) the set of investment pro…les supported by an equilibrium can be either fHH; HLg or fHH; LHg; (b) in case III) both A Lemma 10 tells us that if a limit set underpins several outcomes, then the process can reach an equilibrium sustaining only one outcome by a sequence of single mutations. We now turn our attention to the set of equilibria supporting one outcome only. According to the investment pro…le observed, we can partition this set of equilibria into four subsets denoted respectively H ; L ; HL and LH : Of course, H includes all the equilibria supporting the outcome fHH; V H x HH ; x HH g where x HH 2 D (V H ) : The same applies for the other subsets. The following Lemma highlights that in both games the process can move from any single-outcome equilibrium outside H to a new equilibrium 2 H through a sequence of single-mutation transitions.
Lemma 11
Consider an equilibrium ; then: (a) if 2 L an equilibrium 0 2 H can be reached from by a sequence of single-mutation transitions provided that c B + < x HH < V H c A ; (b) if 2 HL (resp. LH ) an equilibrium 0 2 H can be reached from by a sequence of of single-mutation transitions provided that c B + < x HH < V H c A .
Proof. Since in DG the set L is empty, the …rst point of the Lemma holds for U G only.
(a) Let be an equilibrium belonging to L . From ; by a sequence of single mutations, the process reaches a new equilibrium 2 ( ) in which, for every agent A and B; it is true that: (i) e y . By drifting, all agents B are led to accept the maximum feasible demand made by A in HL and deem that all A make a demand larger than V H c B + at HH: A new equilibrium 1 2 ( ) is thus reached. Suppose now a single agent A changes her demand from y HL to V M . When agents A update, they observe that all Bs have accepted V M ; therefore in HL their best response is y HL = V M . When agents B update they continue to play L since e x i HH ( 1 ) < c B + holds for all Bs. Hence, the process reaches a new equilibrium 0 2 HL where 0 = fHL; (V M ) ; g. From 0 ; by a sequence of single mutations, the process can reach an equilibrium 2 0 in which all agents A have beliefs:
Suppose now an agent B mutates by playing H and making a demand V H y HH in HH. Let all agents B revise; they will choose H and ask V H y HH . When agents A update, the process reaches a new equilibrium 0 2 H in which the pair of demands is (y HH ; V M y HH ). Of course only the last sequence of mutations is required when y HL = V M . The case in which is an equilibrium belonging to LH is similar. Moreover the same argument holds true also for DG with the caveat that any equilibrium belonging to HL now supports the outcome (V M ; ) only.
Lemma 12 Consider U G : Let 2 L be an equilibrium: An equilibrium 0 2
LH [ HL can be reached from by a sequence of single-mutation transitions provided that at 0 the agent who has chosen H is better o¤ ;
Proof. Let 2 L be an equilibrium. From ; by a sequence of single mutations, the process can reach a new equilibrium 2 ( ) in which: at subgame (LH; V M y LH ) each agent A accepts (i.e. she chooses y LH ); for every A, e y
Suppose an agent B mutates by playing H and making a demand V M y LH in LH. When all agents B update, they will choose H since population A has accepted demand V M y LH . When agents A revise they will continue to play L since e y i HH ( ) y LH c A < 0. Hence the process reaches a new equilibrium 0 2 LH in which the pair of demands is (y LH ; V M y LH ) : The case in which 0 is an equilibrium belonging to HL is similar. Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 together asset that, in both games, the adaptive process can lead to an equilibrium 2 H by a sequence of single mutations, starting from any limit set = 2 H . Therefore, according to Proposition 1 of Noldeke and Samuelson (1993), if S is a strictly subset of then S H .
Both Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 in the main text stem from a direct application of Theorem 2 of Ellison (2000) which we now brie ‡y recall. Let be a union of limit sets; these sets can be either mutation connected or not. The Radius R ( ) is the minimum number of mutations needed to escape from the basin of attraction of and enter into another one with positive probability. Consider an arbitrary state = 2 and let (m 1 ; m 2 ; ::; m T ) be a path from to where 1 ; 2 ; :: r is the sequence of limit sets through which the path passes consecutively. Obviously i = 2 for i < r and r . Furthermore, notice that a limit set can appear several times in this sequence but not consecutively. The modi…ed cost of this path is de…ned by: (2000) shows that every union of limit sets with R ( ) > CR ( ) encompasses all the stochastically stable states. In order to compute the minimum number of mutations needed to escape from an equilibrium belonging to H ; both Propositions 4 and 5 make use of the result stated in Lemma 13 below. In what follows we write x as shorthand for an equilibrium belonging to H with (V H x; x) as the distributional rule.
Lemma 13
For su¢ ciently small, the minimum number of mutations needed to get from ( x ) to an equilibrium with the same investment pro…le but di¤ erent demands is: r
where r + B (x) is the number of mutations needed for the transition from x to x+ whereas r A (x) is the number of mutations needed for the transition from x to x . Moreover, r + B (x) is a strictly increasing function of x and r A (x) is a strictly decreasing function of x.
Proof: By a direct application of Young (1993) .
Before giving the proof of Proposition 4 two further preliminary results are needed. These are provided by Lemma 14 and Lemma 15 below. The …rst allows us to argue that a norm of cooperation supporting the e¢ cient investment pro…le evolves in the long run when condition (7) holds. Given this, the second result allows us to argue that norms of distribution arise when the stochastically stable outcome support the e¢ cient investment pro…le. Proof. Point (a). Consider some 2 U CH and let fV H x; xg be the observed pair of demands. We show that starting from U CH it may be possible to enter into the basin of attraction of an equilibrium 0 2 L through a sequence of single-mutation transitions. In order to describe this transition four cases have to be taken into account:
We give the proof for cases (1) and (2) 
From the process can reach a new equilibrium Besides, from Lemmas 10 and 11, we can deduce that for any = 2 H the minimal modi…ed cost for all paths from to IH , is equal to one, whatever the number of limit sets the path goes through may be. Therefore, by putting together these results, we get:
Point (c). We show that, under condition (7), more than one mutation is needed to leave the basin of attraction of U IH even when the worst-case equilibrium scenario is considered as starting state.
I) First we show that a single mutation from H to L does not enable the process to leave the set U IH even if at x 2 U IH each agent expects to receive: (i) the maximum payo¤ when she plays L but the opponent still plays H; (ii) the minimum payo¤ when she plays H but the opponent shifts to L.
Let us consider this scenario and suppose that an agent B had switched from H to L and all agents A revised. This updating does not cause agents A to play
which can be rewritten as
Since x II) We now show that a single mutation from x to x 0 (resp. V H x to y 0 ) does not enable the process to run away from the basin of attraction of U IH even if at x 2 U IH each agent expects to get the maximum payo¤ when she plays L and the opponent chooses H. Let one agent B only change her demand to x 0 . Obviously, no agents B imitate the mutant when revising. When As update we know from Lemma (6) that their best response is either
Under Point (e) of Assumption 1, the former payo¤ is greater than the latter. Hence agents A will not change their demands when updating. Moreover, since (V H x)
, then updating will not cause agents A to play action L. If x 0 < x, agent A expects to get V H x c A when she demands V H x and
Under Point (e) of Assumption 1 the former payo¤ is greater than the latter. Hence, agents A will not change their demands when updating. Moreover, since V H x c A > V M ; then updating will not cause agents A to play action L. The case in which an agent A mutates from V H x to y 0 is symmetric. Since as soon as the mutant revises the process returns to U IH ; then a single mutation from x to x 0 (resp. from V H x to y 0 ) is not enough to escape from the basin of attraction of U IH .
Points I) and II) taken together say that more than one mutation is needed in order to escape from the basin of attraction of We have now to derive the norms of distribution supporting U IH : In order to do this we have: (i) to compute the radius of ( ), i.e. the minimum number of mutations required to destabilize the outcome supported by ; 8 2 U IH ; (ii) to …nd an equilibrium belonging to U IH such that R ( ( )) > CR ( ( )). Lemma 13 provides the minimum number of mutations required to make a transition from x 2 U IH to another equilibrium supporting the same investment pro…le HH, but a di¤erent distributional rule. Lemma 15 below completes all the required details by giving the minimum number of mutations required to make a transition from x 2
Lemma 15 Consider U G . The minimum number of mutations required to get from x 2 U IH to an equilibrium which supports a di¤ erent investment pro…le is:
Proof. i LH = and in the subgame fHL; g all agents B accept. At x ; when some agents B mutate and these mutations induce all agents A to play L, the process enters into the basin of attraction of equilibrium 0 2 L with positive probability. Sure enough, after updating, all agents A decide to play L if
where LHS is the expected payo¤ by playing L and RHS is the expected payo¤ by playing H. However, H ( x ; p 1 ; p 2 ) depends on what the best demand in a match HH is. In particular
The minimum number of mutations in population B comes from the comparison between the solutions of two constraint minimization problems (M 1 and M 2). In both problems the objective function is p 1 + p 2 : In the …rst (resp. second) problem we contemplate the case in which the best action in HH is V H x 0 (resp. V H x). Both problems require p 1 = 0 as a solution. Moreover p
V H x is the solution to the …rst problem and p
; the minimum number of mutations in population B involves that: (i) mutating agents only change their demands in the HH pro…le; (ii) these mutations cause agent A to shift to action L when the best action in HH continues to be V H x. Hence:
Suppose now some agents A mutate. As before, two kinds of mutations must be considered: p 1 agents A mutate by playing L and p 2 agents A mutate by demanding V H x 0 where x 0 < x U B . In this case we look for an equilibrium x 2 U IH in which for all agents: (i) e x i LH = and e x i HL = V M ; (ii) e y i HL = and in the subgame fLH; g all agents A accept. It is easy to see that if some mutations of agents A occurs at x and these mutations induce all agents B to play L; then with positive probability the process enters into the basin of attraction of equilibrium 0 2 L . After updating all agents B decide to play L if
where
Proceeding as before, the minimum number of mutations in population A is
By comparing (23) and (26) we obtain r B (x) < r
Proof of Proposition 4. Point (a). Consider U G : From Point (c) of Lemma 14 we know that S U IH when condition (7) holds. Therefore, we are only left with the task of deriving the distributional norm supporting the equilibria belonging to
IH we compare the results coming from Lemma 13 with those coming from Lemma 15. Notice that r
since these conditions are always satis…ed for any
In order to derive CR ( ( x )) ; two cases must be considered, both compatible with condition (7).
In the …rst case b x
and consider the set of equilibria ( x ) ; let x 2 U IH be an equilibrium with x 6 = x. From Lemma 13 we know that
By the monotonicity of r + B (x) and r A (x) we obtain
Of course, when
it follows from Theorem 2 of Ellison (2000) that S = ( x ) ; the only stochastically stable outcome is thus HH;
V H 2 and the distributional norm is
In the second case b x Point (b). Recall that when condition (7) does not hold then H = U CH ; hence one mutation is enough to exit from the basin of attraction of H (Point (a) of Lemma 14) . In what follow we shall apply Theorem 3 of Ellison (2000) . It is noticing that R ( ) = 1 for any limit set . Indeed let 0 be a limit set; then it is always possible to reach 2 ( ) with one mutation by letting one agent to drift at some unreached information set. Hence, if for limit sets and 0 we have
Concerning the minimal modi…ed cost among all paths from a generic limit set we already know that:
(i) if ( ) is not a singleton, at least one 0 exists with ( 0 ) singleton, such that CR ( 0 ) = 1 (Lemma 10); (ii) if 2 L , at least two limit sets 0 and exist, with di¤erent distributional rules but both belonging to either H or ( HL [ LH ) and such that CR ( 0 ) = CR ( ) = 1 (Point (a) of Lemma 11 and Lemma 12); (iii) if 2 HL (resp. LH ), at least two limit set 0 and exist, with di¤erent distributional rules but both belonging to H and such that CR ( 0 ) = CR ( ) = 1 (Point (b) of Lemma 11); (iv) if 2 H , at least one limit set 0 2 L exists such that CR ( 0 ) = 1 (Point (a) of Lemma 14).
Let be a limit set such that ( ) > 0: By collecting previous information and using Theorem We now turn our attention to game DG and to the proof of Proposition 5. As for game U G ; also in this case two preliminary results are needed. In Lemma IH is equal to one, whatever the number of limit sets the path goes through. In addition, from Lemma 10 and from Point (b) of Lemma 11, we can deduce that, for any = 2 H ; the minimal modi…ed cost for all paths from to D IH is equal to one, whatever the number of limit sets the path goes through may be. Therefore We have now to derive the norms of distribution supporting Proof. We give the proof for r B (x) only; a similar argument can be used for r A (x). 
Given e y LH ; the minimum number of mutations in population B are obtained by solving two constrained minimization problems (M 1 and M 2) . In both problems, the objective function is p 1 + p 2 : In M 1 (resp. M 2), we contemplate the case in which the best action at HH is V H x 0 (resp. V H x).
Both problems require p 1 = 0 as a solution. Moreover, p
is the solution of the …rst minimization problem for whatever value of e y LH ; p (e y LH ) agents B claim x 0 > x. By updating, all agents A play L so that only pro…le LH is observed. Since all agents B claim V M then, after updating, all agents A learn that e y LH = . This implies that no agent A has the incentive to play H if 
